

### REMARKS

Claims 1-43 are pending, with claims 1, 20, and 43 being independent.

Claims 1-8, 10-27, 29-39, 41, and 43 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Corey (5,987,446) in view of Sullivan (6,105,028). Applicants respectfully traverse this rejection.

Claim 1 recites a method for performing a search for both local electronic content and remote electronic content based on a single query that includes, among other features, receiving a single query that includes at least one search term. In response to the single query, the received search term is compared automatically with indexed electronic content that is stored on a local personal computing device to derive a first result and is compared with electronic content that is stored on a remote device to derive a second result. Applicants request reconsideration and withdrawal of this rejection because Corey and Sullivan, either alone or in combination, fail to describe or suggest searching indexed electronic content stored on a local device and searching electronic content stored on a remote device in response to a single query.

Corey describes an information retrieval system that includes multiple search engines that use substantially different computational searching techniques to search a common information item database. In response to an input query, the system retrieves and combines potentially different groups of information items from the search engines as an output in response to the input query. The searching that Corey describes, however, does not disclose comparing “the received search term automatically in response to the single query with indexed electronic content that is stored on a local device to derive a first result,” as recited in independent claims 1, 20, and 43. In rejecting these claims, the Office Action relies on col. 5, lines 15-21 of Corey as disclosing searching electronic content on a local device. That simply is not the case. This section of Corey makes no reference to any storage location of the electronic content that is being searched and in no way identifies the electronic content as being stored on a local device:

In particular, the user inputs a query for desired information to the user interface 22 and the query is provided to the query input interface module 26 for distributing to each of the search engines an appropriate query as detailed hereinbelow. Note that a query input by the user may take on different forms depending on the embodiment of the present invention. For example, such a user

query may be a sequence of terms and phrases that the user believes is associated with the information items desired. See Corey, col. 5, lines 13-21.

Although Corey describes two databases, a literal search lookup database 42 and a semantic similarity index term lookup database 50, both of these databases are derived from a single common information item database 46. See Corey at col. 5, lines 56-62 and col. 6, lines 17-24. Since the two databases that are searched are derived from a common entity, Corey suggests these two databases are stored in a common location. Different groups of information items may be retrieved not because different content sources are being searched but rather because two different search techniques are being used to retrieve items from the same common information item database 46. In contrast, independent claim 1 recites the searching of “electronic content that is stored on a local device” and “electronic information that is stored on a remote device.” Given that Corey describes searching two databases stored in a common location, Corey cannot disclose searching both electronic content stored on a local device *and* electronic content stored on a remote device since these are two different storage locations. For at least these reasons, Corey does not describe or suggest searching indexed electronic content stored on a local device and electronic content stored on a remote device, as recited in claim 1.

Similarly, Sullivan does not disclose and is not relied upon in the Office Action for “comparing the received search term automatically in response to the single query with indexed electronic content that is stored on a local device to derive a first result,” as recited in independent claim 1. Rather, Sullivan describes a method and apparatus for enabling *access* of a document. To do so, an interceptor ascertains whether the computer is connected to a network. The interceptor may access either a locally stored copy of the document or the original document over the network. Sullivan, however, does not perform a search of any sort, and does not use a search term as recited in the claims. Sullivan attempts to locate a single, predetermined document. A search, in contrast, entails looking for one or more data items related to a query, with the data items not being predetermined. Thus, Sullivan also does not describe searching indexed electronic content stored on a local device.

Additionally, a prima facie case of obviousness has not been established because a person skilled in the art would not have been motivated to combine the teachings of Sullivan with Corey. Since Sullivan merely describes a system for accessing a document, there is no proper motivation to combine Sullivan's teachings with Corey's system for searching. Accessing and searching are two fundamentally different concepts and a person of skill in the art would not be motivated to combine the teachings of one with the other.

Moreover, since Sullivan describes a system that accesses either a locally stored copy of the document or the original document over the network, a person skilled in the art would not be motivated to combine Sullivan with another reference to describe or suggest a system that amalgamates results. In Sullivan, no amalgamation of any results occurs. The system either accesses the local copy of the document or the original document over the network. No combination of accessed documents is described and it would not make sense to combine or amalgamate the accessed documents in Sullivan because of versioning or other problems that could result from such an amalgamation of accessing the same document both locally and over the network. Thus, for at least these reasons, a prima facie case of obviousness has not been established because a person skilled in the art would not have been motivated to combine the teachings of Sullivan with Corey.

For at least the reasons presented above, applicants respectfully request withdrawal of the rejection of claim 1 and its dependent claims.

Similarly to claim 1, claims 20 and 43 recite a computer program stored on a computer readable medium or a propagated signal (claim 20) and a system (claim 43) for performing a search for both local electronic content and remote electronic content based on a single query. For at least the reasons presented above with respect to claim 1, applicants respectfully request withdrawal of the rejection of claims 20 and 43 and their dependent claims.

Claims 9 and 28, which depend from independent claims 1 and 20 respectively, were rejected separately in the Office Action under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Corey. Based on their dependency to claims 1 and 20 and for the reasons discussed above, applicants request withdrawal of the rejection of claims 9 and 28.


Claims 40 and 42, which depend indirectly from independent claims 1 and 20 respectively, stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Corey in view of Sullivan and further in view of Yong Meng TEO. Yong Meng TEO does not remedy the failures of Corey and Sullivan described above and is not relied upon in the Office Action for that purpose. Accordingly, for at least the reasons discussed above with respect to claims 1 and 20, applicants request withdrawal of the rejection of claims 40 and 42.

Applicants submit that all claims are in condition for allowance.

No fees are believed to be due. However, during the prosecution of this application, please apply any deficiencies or credits to deposit account 06-1050.

Respectfully submitted,

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Joseph F. Key  
Reg. No. 44,827

Fish & Richardson P.C.  
1425 K Street, N.W.  
11th Floor  
Washington, DC 20005-3500  
Telephone: (202) 783-5070  
Facsimile: (202) 783-2331